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Insurance Fund; DAVID S.
MONSON, State Auditor; and
DAVID L. DUNCAN, State
Treasurer,
DefendantsAppellants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CARLYLE F. GRONNING, in his
official capacity as Chairman
Commissioner of the Industrial
Commission of Utah,
PlaintiffRespondents,

Case No. 14846

~vs~
HERBERT P. SMART, in his
official capacity as Director
of Finance, Department of
Finance, State of Utah, and
Administrator of the State
Insurance Fund; DAVID S.
MONSON, State Auditor; and
DAVID L. DUNCAN, State
Treasurer,
DefendantsAppellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment
which declared constitutional Item No. 33, House Bill
No. 373, 41st Legislature 1975 General Session, and
Item No. 39, House Bill No. 91, 41st Legislature 1976
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Budget Lassion, which respectively appropriated
$358,000.00 and $408,200.00 from the State Insurance
Fund to the Industrial Commission.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court held that the two enactments were constitutional and did not violate the provisions
of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution or the
14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the order and
judgment of the District Court and declaration by the
Supreme Court that the appropriations of money from the
Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission are unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this case was decided on motions for
summary judgment, there are no serious disputes as to
the facts.

The complaint, together with the attached

documents, sets out the problem quite fully and also
sets out the factual background.
To be quite brief, this action was filed
after the Attorney General had issued an opinion dated
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February 20, 19 75, holding that the Legislature could
not constitutionally appropriate Insurance Fund money
to finance the programs of the Industrial Commission.
[R. 3 ] #

There were attempts made to seek a court

determination of the question prior to the 1976 Budget
Session, but this was not done, and with knowledge of
the opinion the Legislature again appropriated Insurance
Fund money to the Industrial Commission.

[R.4-6 ] . it

also appears that the practice existed before, apparently
following a time when Insurance Fund inspectors were
paid by the Fund but worked entirely for the Industrial
Commission.

The money so appropriated in 1975 and 1976

had not been released to the Commission and it became
necessary for the Chairman to file this action for
declaratory relief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS A
STATE AGENCY WHICH EXERCISES THE
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ENTIRELY
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE FUND.
In 1917, Utah recognized that the common law
afforded little relief to an injured workman.

It

established the Industrial Commission to administer a
no fault program for compensating workmen who were
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injured in the course of employment.

The cost of the

program was to be carried by employers and was to be
passed along to consumers as a part of production
costs.

The Commission was given authority in contested

situations to determine whether the injury was in the
course of employment and to determine the extent of
injury and to determine the amount of the award.
Of course the Commission has a much broader
scope of duty and authority than the administration
and adjudication of claims of workmen, and these duties
and areas of authority continue to increase as the
Legislature and Congress become more and more concerned
over the years about the life, health, welfare and
conditions of employment of all classes of employed
people.
The Commission is the labor relations board
for the State of Utah (34-20-3) and is empowered to
prevent unfair labor practices in intrastate commerce
(34-20-10); it may permit mines or smelters to employ
workers for more than eight hours per day if it certifies
that such work is not detrimental to the life, health,
safety and welfare of such men (34-21-2); it may regulate
conditions- involving employment of women and minors
(34-22-1, et seq.), including the establishment of
minimum wages (34-22-13) and maximum hours (34-22-14).
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The Commission may permit exceptions in some cases for
employment of youth under eighteen in hazardous
occupations (34-23-2) and is to enforce the requirements
of the chapter relating to school and age limitations
placed on certain categories of employment (34-23-11).
The Commission is to insure compliance with requirements
for payment of wages (34-28-9).

It must approve an

applicant who wishes to operate an employment agency
(34-29-21).

It has jurisdiction to determine whether

a contractor has violated provisions of law relating
to public contracts (34-30-5).

The Commission is to

enforce the Anti-discrimination Act (34-35-3).

It is

to adopt rules and regulations relating to motor vehicles
furnished by an employer to transport workers to and
from places of employment (34-36-2) .

The Commission

is

to see that places of employment are safe and that
safety devices and safeguards are employed (35-1-12)
and may inspect to secure compliances (35-1-15) and
to exercise the extensive powers of supervision
control set out in 35-1-16.

.

and

It may require information

from employers to carry out the purposes of the title
(35-1-41) and may impose sanctions upon an employer who
has not secured compensation (35-1-46).

It must ad-

judicate claims for compensation (35-1-82.51, et seq.).
The Commission administers the Occupational Disease Act
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(35-2-2).

It also administers the Unemployment Security

Act.
The purpose of the enumeration of the duties
and responsibilities of the Commission are simply to
illustrate that it is responsible for the exercise of
a great deal of the State's police power as it applies
to employment.
As Plaintiff-Respondent pointed out in his
memorandum in support of his motion for summary
judgment [R. 73 ] , after describing the enforcement
for health, safety and welfare as the traditional role
of the Industrial Commission says that, "The State
Insurance Fund possesses no such power.

It is con-

sistent with the purposes behind all Workmenf s Compensation Acts that the safety inspection program rests
with the same agency that has the duty and power to
enforce laws for the protection of an employee's life,
health, safety and welfare. . ."
It is apparent that the Insurance Fund has
no responsibility for the work of the Commission, has
no enforcement power whatever and no duty to enforce
laws, policies or rules of the State or the United
States relating to the health, safety or welfare
of

employees.
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POINT II
THE INSURANCE FUND IS A STATE
ADMINISTERED MUTUAL INSURANCE
PROGRAM AND THE MONEY OR ASSETS
THEREIN ARE THE PROPERTY OF
CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYERS.
A*

Nature of the Fund.

The Legislature imposed a duty upon employers
to secure compensation to injured employees and imposed
sanctions, both civil and criminal/ for failure so to
do, 35-1-46, U.C.A. 1953.

This section permits employers

to secure such compensation in one of three ways:
1.

By insuring with the State Insurance
Fund;

2.

By insuring with a private insurer;

3.

By being self-insured upon satisfactory proof of financial ability
to the Industrial Commission.

The purpose of the insurance requirement is to
guarantee recovery by the injured employee upon entitlement .
The State Insurance Fund was established ". . .
for the purpose of insuring employers against liability
for compensation . . . and of assuring to the persons
entitled thereto the compensation provided by law.

Such

fund shall consist of all premiums and penalties received
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and paid into the fund, of property and securities
acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging
to the fund, and of interest earned, . . Such fund
shall be applicable to the payment of losses sustained
on account of insurance, to the payment of compensation, and to the payment of salaries and other
expenses charged against it in accordance with the
provisions of this title. . . .

In the conduct and

administration of the business of said fund the
commission of finance may appoint . . . a manager,
and may employ accountants, inspectors, attorneys,
physicians, investigators, clerks, stenographers and
such other experts and assistants as it deems advisable."
(Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, emp. added.)
The commission of finance is to administer the
fund, write compensation insurance, conduct all business
11

. . . and do any and all things in connection with all

insurance business to be carried on . . . and is vested
with full authority over said fund.

It may do any and

all things. . . which are necessary or convenient in
the administration thereof or in connection with the
insurance business carried on by it under the provisions
of this title as fully and completely as the governing
body of a private insurance carrier. . • ."

(Section

35-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, emp. added.)
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The commission must establish classes of
employment and risks in order to determine proper
premiums to get the lowest possible rate consistent
with the maintenance of a solvent fund and the creation
of a surplus and reserve.

[35-3-4, 35-3-10(2)].

If

a balance remains after making provisions required by
law and the judgment of the commission to meet possible
obligations of the fund, the commission is to declare
a lump sum dividend for the benefit of policyholders
[35-3-10(4)].

The Legislature also saw fit to impose

a premium tax on the fund equal to that imposed on
insurance companies [35-3-16].
It appears clear that the Insurance Fund is
in effect a state sponsored insurance company by which
employers can secure required coverage under Section
35-1-46, at the lowest possible rate, and if there is
accumulated more money than required by the Fund,
secure a dividend.
The Fund is not an arm of the State existing
to enforce requirements calling for safe places to work
or to eliminate hazards which result in occupational
diseases.

These functions of the Industrial Commission

would exist quite independently of any provisions of law
assuring recovery of monies due to injured workmen.
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B.

The Fund Belongs to Contributing Employers.

The definitive case in Utah is Chez, Atty. Gon. v.
Industrial Comm. of Utah, 90 U. 447, 62 P.2d, 549, 108
A.L.R. 365.

The Fund had purchased bonds issued by the

town of Scipio which sought to compromise an obligation
of $7,517.40 for $7,200.00.

The direct question was

whether the debt was an "indebtedness to the State11.
The Court held that within the meaning of the Constitution it was not such a debt.
The Court determined to examine the nature of
the State Insurance Fund to see what it really is.

". . *

It will be noted that the basic source of the fund is the
premiums and penalties —

nothing else. . . .

It is paid

on account of the employer for compensation for which he
is primarily liable.

(court's emphasis).

See American

Fuel Co. of Utah v. Industrial Comm., 55 U. 483, 187 P.
633, 8 A.L.R. 1342.

The employer really pools his premiums

in the State Fund to create a fund for the payment of an
obligation for which it is liable.

It is a common fund

belonging to the participating employers. . . !l

(62 P. 2d

549, 550 emp. added.)
The court pointed out that had employers so
pooled their money under management which they selected,
there would be no question as to the nature of the fund.
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" . . . But basically it is no different than if the state
and a number of private employers agreed to establish their
own fund.

It was made easier by setting up a skeleton fund

to begin with, giving the Industrial Commission the administration of it and providing by law for rules and
regulations to govern it.

That reaches more quickly and

more easily the same result as a mutual company would have
reached.

It served to give employers. . . a means to get

the insurance practically for the costs of the compensation
without charges for profits or acquisition and in addition
gave it a public aspect and made its administration and
management subject to public audit, inspection, and
responsibility.

But it did not change the essential

nature of the venture.

It was a venture by the state as

an employer and certain private employers who chose to
come in, in which they pooled their premiums to create a
fund for the purpose of paying, not a state obligation or
making expenditures on behalf of the state but of paying
their own contingent compensation liabilities. . . fl
(62 P.2d 549, 550 emp. added.)
" . . . Thus, the state in effect says:

'We

will create, establish, manage, collect and administer
through the Industrial Commission but as an agent and
trustee only for the contributing employers' . . „ .
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balances earned ^ M not needed as reserves are turned
where?

Not to the state but back to the contri butin.j

employers. . .

It belongs, not to the state, but to_

the contributing employers for their mutual benefit.
It constitutes a pooling of risks under the auspices
of the state.

(cites omitted.) . . . " 6 2 P.2d 549,

551.
What becomes obvious then is that the Fund
is owned by contributing employers, held in trust by
the State, established to cover liabilities of employers under the workmen's compensation laws of the
state.

The Fund may be charged for necessary expenses

incurred in operation, but its nature is unchanged,
c.f.

Moran v. State, Okla. 1975, 534 P.2d 1282.
C.

Power of the Fund to Employ Necessary

Personnel.
Defendants-Appellants concede that the
Insurance Fund was intended to sustain itself financially, and that it may be charged for necessary
servies such as the costs of audits, and may employ
sufficient people to perform services for its purposes,
to include attorneys, claims adjusters, actuaries,
secretaries and the like.
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Assuming that the Fund is interested, as any
insurer would logically be, in holding claims against
the Fund to a minimum, it is apparently within the
power of the Fund to employ inspectors either to make
sure that proper premiums are charged for risks assumed
or to eliminate or reduce hazards of employment for
its policyholders.

In the case of the Fund, such a

program might well reduce premiums or cause higher
dividends to be returned to contributing employers.
In the case of a private insurer, the savings could
result in a reduction of premium charges or in increased profits.

It should be pointed out that in

neither case could an employer be required to follow
safety suggestions so made nor could the Fund or
private insurer compel compliance by closing the
plant or exercising other police powers.

A decision

by an insurer to deny coverage or to increase the
premium to insure a particular employer does not
constitute an exercise of State Police Power.
The program theorized above is quite
different than a levy upon the assets of the Fund
to support the general regulatory function of the
Commission.
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POINT III
THE TAKING OF ASSETS FROM THE
INSURANCE FUND FOR THE OPERATION
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE
I SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.
From what has already been reviewed above, the
money in the Insurance Fund is not State owned funds
subject to general appropriation by the Legislature.
The money belongs to the employers who paid it into the
common pool,

Chez v. Ind. Comm., (supra).

The Third District Court in Golden R. Allen v.
Glen Swenson, (1969), Case No. 187,703, has held that
Chapter 263 L. 1969, which provided for transfer of
$8,100,200.00 from the Fund to the General Fund for
use by the State Building Board was void because of
violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.

An appeal was filed in Allen v.

Swenson, but was dismissed when the Legislature repealed the "appropriation".
The money in the Fund is not public money
which can be used to meet expenses of government.
It is a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of
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employers when an employee is entitled to compensation.
The effort here is made to expend trust funds for governmental purposes.
The safety program is a general duty of the
Industrial Commission and is not carried on at the
request of or for the particular benefit of the Fund*
It is no more the responsibility of the Fund than of
self insuring employers or of private insurance companies to carry out inspection programs and it is
obvious that no such "duty" exists.

It is no answer

to the expropriation of employers' money from the
Fund to say that a certain percentage of employers
satisfy their contingent obligation to pay for injury
or disability by using the vehicle of the Fund whether
the percentage is five, sixty or eighty five, and
should therefor pay a cost which would be paid for
by taxes; nor is it an answer to say that since the
Fund may charge a lower premium than a private carrier,
it should "contribute" in lieu of taxes paid by a
private insurer a certain part of costs of the
Commission, since

it is rather apparent that a

"self-insurer" as an insurer pays nothing at all,
not even a premium tax imposed on private companies
and on the Fund.
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The taking of the money from the Insurance
Fund in such amounts as appear to be available without
standards of any kind, without any representation of
employers of any kind, without any kind of hearing or
notice, as the Legislature has sought to do clearly
constitute a taking of property in violation of the
Constitution since there is no compensation to the
owners, and the taking is from only one class of
employers, those who insure with the Fund, as contrasted with those who insure with private carriers
or those who are self insured.

Such discrimination

cannot be approved by this Court, no matter how
worthy the purpose may be.
If the Fund in fact has had some Seven
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($700,000.00) in unneeded
funds, the amount should be returned to contributing
employers.

In fact the Legislature simply applied

trust funds to its own use, a situation highly
disapproved of in the case of private trustees.

CONCLUSION
Unless this Court overrules its decision
in Chez v. Industrial Comm., (supra) it cannot escape
the conclusion that the Fund belongs to contributing
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employers who are entitled to receive dividends of
money not needed by the Fund to meet its operating
costs, claims against the Fund, and to provide a
reserve against catastrophes if any should occur.
The appropriation of Insurance Fund
moneys to the use of the Commission to perform its
duties as a unit of government exercising state
police power is an invasion of trust funds by the
State as a trustee without any substantial claim
of legal right*

The taking also deprives the

owners of the Fund of

their property without due

process of law.
The appropriation cannot be justified as
an indirect employment of personnel to accomplish a
direct benefit for the Fund, nor does the fact that
the illegal practice may have existed for some time
justify the continuance.
The unconstitutional use of trust funds
by the Legislature should be called such by this
Court, and the decision below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. MCCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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